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ABSTRACT The objective of the paper is to analyze why the pattern of growth
based on the Washington consensus, implemented in many Latin American semi-
industrialized economies, has so frequently led to a fall in private savings and to
foreign-exchange crises. Thus the author considers the underpinnings and conse-
quences of the most important measures taken by those economies, by referring to
financial liberalization and the opening of their domestic markets to import com-
petition, as well as to the priority given to the foreign over the domestic market.
The author shows that the adjustment package normally brings about a fall in out-
put and employment, coupled with inflationary pressures and a worsening of in-
come distribution. He also argues that output recovery, when it takes place, comes
into being thanks to an improvement in external conditions and to an expansion of
government demand. Thus, it is the government and not the market that leads the
recovery.
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ESTRATÉGIAS DE MODERNIZAÇÃO, CRISES E AJUSTAMENTO
NAS ECONOMIAS DA AMÉRICA LATINA
RESUMO O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a razão pela qual a trajetória de cresci-
mento de muitas economias latino-americanas, baseada no consenso de Washing-
ton, tem resultado na queda da poupança privada e em crises no setor externo.
* The author would like to acknowledge the useful comments of two anonymous referees of this
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Neste sentido, o autor considera as conseqüências das principais medidas tomadas
por estas economias, associadas à liberalização financeira, à abertura das economias
às importações e à prioridade dada ao mercado externo em detrimento do interno.
É mostrado que o pacote de ajustamentos produz queda do emprego e do produto,
junto com pressões inflacionárias e piora da distribuição de renda. Argumenta-se
também que, quando há recuperação da economia, ela ocorre devido à melhoria
das condições externas e aumento da demanda governamental. Portanto, é o
governo e não o mercado que lidera a recuperação econômica.
Palavras-chave: macroeconomia, política econômica
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1. INTRODUCTION
When Chile’s socialist government under Allende was overthrown in 1993,
the country began a steady process to overhaul its previous economic strat-
egies, an example that was soon to be followed by other Latin American
countries. The protection of domestic producers, support of the internal
market, and government intervention were replaced by the opening up of
the domestic market to imports, priority for external over domestic sales,
and a retrenching of the economic role of the state. Simultaneously, the do-
mestic financial sector was liberalized and deregulated and restrictions on
capital movements were abolished.
These economies have, in fact, achieved growth under this new strategy
of modernization, but this has usually led to increasing external imbalance
and to crises that were followed by drastic adjustment packages.
The objective of this paper is to carry out a theoretical reflection on this
particular modernization strategy on the basis of Latin America’s experi-
ence, and especially to analyze why the new pattern of growth has so fre-
quently led to a fall in private savings and to foreign-exchange crises. In or-
der to do so, I will consider the underpinnings and consequences of the
most important measures taken by those economies, by referring to finan-
cial liberalization and the opening of their domestic markets to import
competition, as well as to the priority given to the foreign over the domestic
market. In a second stage, I shall consider the rationale and the conse-
quences of the adjustment packages implemented to cope with the crises.
Latin American semi-industrialized economies are far from homoge-
neous, and their economic policies over the last years and the results
achieved so far have been disparate. There are particular aspects of the
modernization strategy, however, that have been implemented in indi-
vidual countries at various periods. I will try to detect the stylized facts of
their common experiences by frequently referring to two national cases,
Chile’s during the 1977-1981 period and Mexico’s during the 1988-1994
period,1 because they show the most accomplished execution of the mod-
ernization strategy. Since the interest of the paper lies in the theoretical as-
pects involved, I shall not give a detailed account of the evolution of any
particular country, nor bring the specificity or differences of Latin Ameri-
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can economies to light, but rather emphasize the most common and out-
standing features of their experience.
FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION, TRADE OPENING AND GROWTH
The basic tenets of financial modernization stem from the idea that in order
to stimulate higher growth rates of output, the level and rate of savings and
investment should be raised, and the efficiency of investment should be im-
proved.
In agreement with the strategy of financial modernization, asset and
liability management was liberalized, compulsory reserves were eliminated,
interest rates were freed, banks were permitted to borrow abroad without
restriction, and non-residents were allowed to invest in domestic financial
assets practically unencumbered. The deregulation of the financial domes-
tic sector enlarged the banks’ possibilities to manage assets and liabilities, to
reduce their reserve requirements, and to innovate with new financial in-
struments. All these elements generated an enhanced capacity for the ex-
pansion of credit.
The liberalization of capital movements did not produce a massive surge
of direct foreign investment to Latin America, but it did attract a large in-
flow of short-term financial resources, which was extremely helpful in the
fight against inflation, though it contributed to a real appreciation of the
currency.
The inflow of short-term capital and the consequent demand for finan-
cial assets raised the dollar value of shares, of equity of large firms, and of
private wealth, and allowed real interest rates to be lower than they prob-
ably would have been otherwise. Larger real wealth and greater availability
of credit stimulated higher private spending decisions.
A part of the “extra” spending decisions went into investment. The rise
in the value of the firms’ capital probably reduced the risk of new invest-
ments, and also left firms with an untapped indebtedness disposition, be-
cause the ratio of commitments to own capital declined when the value of
the latter rose. An additional stimulus to private investment resulted from
the appreciation of the domestic currency, which reduced the burden of the
debt of firms indebted in dollars as well as the supply price of imported
capital goods.
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Financial modernization also revitalized consumption. Consumption of
the higher-income-bracket groups skyrocketed due to the rise in the capital
value of financial assets and to the availability of foreign sophisticated goods
previously unavailable. But mass consumption was also encouraged since
formerly very expensive imported goods became cheaper, and because the
appreciation of the domestic currency intensified the pressure of foreign
competition and domestic producers were obliged to lower their profit
margins.
Credit rationing is pervasive in Latin America. Thus, given the high con-
centration of the banking system, real interest rates and the differential be-
tween the lending and the deposit interest rates rose considerably. However,
credit expansion meant that some of the previously unsatisfied borrowers
could now obtain finance through the formal credit market with real inter-
est rates probably lower than in the informal market. In other words, a
larger part of the latent demand for credit could now manifest itself as ac-
tual demand, with the supply of credit accommodating the increased de-
mand.2
An outcome of the process was a massive rise in indebtedness of the
non-bank private sector towards the banking sector. Thus a situation of do-
mestic financial fragility developed together with a rise in the share of non-
performing loans over total loans, which was mostly due to the substitution
of private for government loans in the balance sheets of banks.
The underpinnings of trade opening, which was the second fundamental
measure taken by these economies, are relatively well known. According to
the underlying theory, trade opening would bring both static and dynamic
benefits. Thus lower prices as well as competition of imports would tend to
abate domestic costs, profit margins and domestic prices. Lower domestic
prices would generate a real depreciation of the domestic currency, which
would invigorate exports.
The change in the pattern of production according to comparative ad-
vantages would also result beneficial. Lower tariffs and elimination of im-
port restrictions would tend to bring relative domestic prices closer to rela-
tive international prices. Relative prices and profitability of goods lacking
comparative advantage would fall, while relative prices and profitability of
goods with comparative advantage would rise, and new investments would
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be channeled towards sectors and branches that enjoy comparative advan-
tages.
Given factor endowment in these economies, characterized by the abun-
dance of labor and scarcity of capital, the average capital-output ratio would
decline while the level (or the rate of growth) of labor productivity would be
reduced, so that labor absorption would be raised. Thus, the same growth
rate of output would be achieved with a higher rate and level of consump-
tion and a greater rate of employment increase; otherwise, a higher growth
rate of output and employment could be achieved with the same level and
rate of investment. Due to the higher demand for labor, the share of wages
in output would be enhanced while the share of capital would be reduced
(Stolper-Samuelson theorem).
Following the opening-up of the economy, there was indeed a dramatic
increase in the weight of exports and imports in overall demand and supply.
Tariff reduction and drastic decrease or elimination of non-tariff controls
generated a liberalization of imports.
Some very important short-term objectives were in fact reached, thanks
to the liberalization of imports. Thus, the free access to, and the lower cost
of imported inputs whose tariffs were reduced helped foster the strong
growth of exports, and contributed to increase the weight of manufacturing
exports in total exports.3 On the other hand, the pressure of competition
from imports encouraged a reduction in profit margins, which brought
about a rise in the share of wages in value added.
As previously mentioned, the process of opening-up was accompanied
by a strong growth of the import coefficient and of total imports, and by a
worsening of the current account deficit. Imports of consumer goods sky-
rocketed. However, the huge increase of imports of inputs and of capital
goods was the most important factor behind the rise of the import bill.
The strong growth of the coefficient and the value of imports was partly
due to the real appreciation of the domestic currency and the liberalization
of imports. But two additional factors also contributed to that rise.
In the first place, the possibility of buying imported goods that were pre-
viously prohibited or excessive in price stimulated the consumption and
import of those goods. In the second place, the opening-up of the economy
stirred a process of modernization, which also encouraged imports. Indeed,
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under the new scenario the domestic market became more exacting due to
the competition of imports, even as new firms became exporters and had to
compete in the highly demanding international market. In many cases the
new requirements, such as e.g., utilization of inputs of higher quality, stan-
dardization of parts and pieces, security in the timely supply etc., could not
be satisfied by domestic producers, and firms were compelled to increase
their imports of capital goods and inputs.4
The processes of modernization and structural change also contributed
to the rise of the growth rate of the average labor productivity. First of all,
the change of the productive and commercial structure in favor of labor-in-
tensive goods seems not to have taken place. In the Mexican economy, for
example, where manufacturing exports led the export boom, the previous
pattern of exports based on capital-intensive goods did not give way to a
new one based on labor-intensive goods, but was in fact strengthened
(López, 1997). In the second place, in order to confront more competitive
markets, national firms had to raise their investment and adopt measures of
modernization and organizational change (Barros, 2001). This created a
rise in the growth rate of labor productivity at the level of each particular
firm and of each branch of economic activity. In the third place, there was a
change in the structure of demand that augmented the relative weight in
production of the high-productivity branches and sectors. Simultaneously,
numerous small firms in which labor productivity is lower than average dis-
appeared, due to the pressure of competition from imports and from reno-
vated national firms. Through a composition effect, the latter two factors
also induced a rise in the rate of growth of the average productivity of labor.
We may now summarize the main macroeconomic effects of the mod-
ernization strategy.
The modernization strategy did contribute to a stimulation of the
growth of demand. The growth rate of output, however, was relatively low,
especially when weighted against the expansion of the autonomous compo-
nents of demand. The reason lies in the increase in the coefficient of import,
which leaked part of the domestic demand away from the internal market
and reduced the multiplier of autonomous expenditure.
Growth of employment was also negatively affected during the modern-
ization strategy, and was actually far below previous experiences of growth
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renewal. The cause of this lies in both the insufficient growth rate of output
and in the acceleration of the growth rate of average labor productivity. The
open rate of unemployment did not grow much due to lack of unemploy-
ment insurance in Latin America, but disguised unemployment swelled.
The fall in the rate of employment absorption in the formal sector of the
economy contributed to a worsening of income distribution. In fact, its
negative effect probably more than offset the positive effect of the rise in the
share of wages in the value added consequent upon the fall in profit mar-
gins. Thus, income distribution worsened.
Lastly, growth was accompanied by an ever-increasing current account
deficit, which finally provoked a foreign-exchange crisis. To conclude this
section, it is important to emphasize that the deficit was to a large extent
caused by the private sector, and specifically by an increase in private invest-
ment that was not matched by a rise in private saving. Generally speaking,
the rate of private saving did not rise but, in fact, fell. Thus, in Latin
America’s recent experience, financial modernization did result in higher
foreign savings, coupled with a fall in private saving. It is to this last issue
that we will now turn.
2. SAVING AND INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA’S CRISES
Nowadays, a dominant explanation for the underlying causes of the recent
crises in Latin America is accepted by both the economic authorities and
some of their critics. This explanation blames insufficient internal savings
and investment as the ultimate cause of the growing current account deficit
that has led to crises.
This dominant view on crises is based on accounting identity, whereby
the current account deficit equals the surplus of private investment over
private savings plus the budget deficit. In order to discuss the dominant
view it seems useful to present this identity in full.
The Gross Domestic Product Y equals private consumption Cp, plus pri-
vate investment I p, plus the trade balance X – M, plus government expendi-
ture G:
Y = C p + I p + X – M + G (1)
Let T be personal taxes. Then:
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Y – T = Y p (2)
Y p: Personal disposable income
Yp – C p = S p (3)
S p: Private savings
T – G = S g (4)
S g: Government savings
M – X ≡ S f (5)
Sf: Foreign savings = Current account deficit5
Upon reordering terms:
Sf = –Sg + (I p – S p) (5a)
Or:
S p = –S g + I p – S f (3a)
From the above it would appear that if private savings had been higher,
the external deficit would have been reduced — and the crises avoided.
However, this outlook is hardly helpful for the analysis of the evolution
of savings, because it is based on an ex-post identity which does not reveal
how savings come into being. It seems, therefore, more useful to once again
consider the aggregate demand and the savings equations, which can be re-
written as follows:
Y = Y (X, I p, G, w, s, τ, m) (1a)
And:
S p = G + I p + X – τY – mY (3b)
Where w, s, τ, m denote the ratio of wages, total savings, taxation and
imports, over GDP, respectively, and where it can be shown that:6
Y1 > 0, Y2 > 0, Y3 > 0, Y4 > 0; Y5 < 0, Y6 < 0, Y7 < 0.
Let us now consider the effects of an increase in the overall savings coef-
ficient s, on the basis of equations (1a) and (5a). It can easily be observed
that this rise, ceteris paribus, would have allowed for an increase in private
saving and a reduction in the current account deficit (a fall in S f). However,
since private investment is given in any short-run and exports are indepen-
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dent of s, the rise in private saving will exclusively arise due to the negative
impact of the increase in the saving coefficient on effective demand and
output.7 Thus, a larger coefficient of savings would have reduced the de-
mand for imports and the external deficit, because output would have been
lower; the same goes for employment, profits, wages and the degree of ca-
pacity utilization. The current account deficit might have been avoided, but
only because the macroeconomic situation would have been more de-
pressed to start with.
The mainstream explanation of the determinants of the crises is thus
flawed in the sense that private saving was diminished because the current
account was in deficit, and not the other way around.
An alternative interpretation concerning the origins of the external defi-
cit which avoids this inconsistency is rather Keynesian-Structuralist in char-
acter. It acknowledges the dependency of savings on investment, emphasiz-
ing the insufficient rate as well as the misallocation of investment.
The rationale underlying this interpretation seems to be the following
(Ros, 1995). On the one hand, overall investment was discouraged because
of the high interest rates that were needed to sustain the high value of the
domestic currency. On the other hand, the real appreciation of the currency
depressed the profitability of, and shifted investments away from, the trad-
able goods sector.
This argument holds that if the rate of investment had been higher, and
the share of investment allocated to the tradable goods sector larger, the
productive capacities would have been enlarged and, simultaneously, the
rate of technical progress would have been raised. The former would have
ensured a greater elasticity of supply and the latter would have reduced
costs and enhanced competitiveness. Thus higher and better allocation of
investment would have stimulated exports and helped reduce the import
coefficient.
The above reasoning is, nevertheless, not entirely persuasive.
First of all, it does not seem to be convincingly supported by the facts.
On the one hand, there is no evidence of a lack of productive capacity at the
level of the whole economy, which might have hampered production. In
fact, it is rather the opposite, for in both Chile in the 1977-1981 period and
in Mexico between 1987 and 1994, the capital-output ratio either rose
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(Chile) or remained at a higher-than-average level (Mexico), which sug-
gests the existence of idle capacities (Hofman, 1997). Investment, on the
other hand, did grow fast and there is no strong evidence that it was
misallocated. In the period between 1988 and 1994, for example, Mexico´s
gross total fixed investment, machinery and equipment and private invest-
ment, all grew at relatively fast rates (7.5 percent, 11.2 percent and 9.2 per-
cent annual rates respectively), all higher than the rate of growth of output
(3.9 percent). At the same time, the share of investment allocated to the
tradables sector rose (from 27.4 percent to 42.5 percent of total investment
between 1987 and 1993) — and this in spite of the large appreciation of the
peso. In Chile, gross total fixed investment grew at an 18 percent annual
rate between 1977 and 1981 (with output growing 7.4 percent annually),
while the share of investment in machinery and equipment in total invest-
ment grew from 5.9 percent in 1977 to 7.3 percent in 1981.
In the second place, given that the effects of investment on technical
progress are rather delayed, it is doubtful whether a speedier investment
growth would have ensured important gains in competitiveness in the short
term.
Finally, Latin America has a relatively high coefficient of imports of in-
vestment. The average import coefficient would, therefore, probably have
grown rather than diminished if investment had grown faster, due to a
composition effect. Thus, as can be seen from equation (1a), ceteris paribus,
if investment (and total savings) had been higher, output, employment,
wages and profits would have been greater as well. This would, at the same
time, have generated a bigger demand for imports and a larger external defi-
cit. The trade deficit would then, in fact, have been larger.
There is, nevertheless, an important element of truth in the structuralist
part of the previous argument, insofar as there actually was a lack of pro-
ductive capacity which was not made up for by new investment. But this
lack of productive capacity did not affect the overall economy nor the
tradables sector in general, but, instead, only some specific branches and
activities.
Indeed, I already mentioned that growth was generally accompanied by
a strong increase in the import coefficient, which suggests that new invest-
ments lagged behind the requirements of the import-substituting factories
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and branches. A certain growth of the import coefficient was probably un-
avoidable, but excesses could have been prevented with an adequate invest-
ment strategy.
I will now summarize the points stated above. Low private saving did not
provoke the growing and persistent current account deficit nor caused the
crises: low private saving was the consequence and not the cause of the for-
eign deficit. Nor would a higher rate of investment have prevented the cur-
rent deficit from swelling, for if that rate had been higher, the deficit would
have been so as well. The explanation for the deficit must, on the one hand,
rather be sought in the opening of the domestic market to imports, and, on
the other, in the appreciation of the domestic currency and the ensuing loss
of competitiveness. An additional, structural factor was also very important:
the paucity of investment in specific branches and firms capable of turning
out the inputs and capital goods that were required in the novel context. The
opening-up of the economy did not so much require a higher rate of invest-
ment, but rather a much more selective allocation of investment.
3. THE FOREIGN-EXCHANGE CRISES AND THE ADJUSTMENT PACKAGE
Before the crises, neither governments nor the international financial agen-
cies had shown any concern with regard to the persistent growth of the cur-
rent account deficit.8 The argument that foreign saving is safe and beneficial
for growth when accounted for by the excess of private investment over pri-
vate saving rather than by government deficit, partly explains this misap-
prehension. Another reason comes from the difficulty to evaluate the
soundness or otherwise of foreign indebtedness, since the signs given by the
market are normally far from clear and the fundamentals may seem satis-
factory.
Indeed, on the one hand, investment and capacities usually expand. On
the other, exports normally keep growing at a relatively fast rate, at least
during a certain time, in spite of currency appreciation. Third, inflationary
tendencies are controlled thanks to appreciation of the domestic currency.
And finally, inflows of short-term foreign capital keep growing.
Besides, it may not be easy for economic authorities, for both economic
and political reasons, to depreciate the domestic currency in order to re-
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dress the foreign balance. Latin American economies are characterized by
strong oligopolies in the banking sector and by a huge latent demand for
credit. Thus, unless some controls are imposed on the inflow of short-term
foreign funds — controls that are not accepted in the dominant view —
a significant excess of the domestic over the international real interest rate
may persist for quite some time. Thus the country’s attractiveness to foreign
investors and the swelling of the reserves with foreign exchange which tend
to appreciate the domestic currency may be maintained.
In other words, institutional reforms and government measures allow
the development of a situation of both domestic and external financial fra-
gility, because private expenditure and debt rise fast, even when the weight
of foreign-denominated liabilities in the balance sheets of private agents is
increased. But in that case the government has very limited maneuvering
ability to avoid the development of an external financial fragility, other than
reverting to very restrictive demand policies. If the latter are implemented,
the crisis may perhaps be avoided. But the cost would be a fall in the level of
economic activity –milder than the one ensuing from a crisis, but very dras-
tic nonetheless.
I shall now analyze the adjustment package used to confront the crises,
by arguing that the economic policies implemented, even though instru-
mental in coping with the external deficit, cause a strong recession in com-
bination with falling real wages and worsening income distribution, due to
their contractionary impact on aggregate demand and supply. This leads to
a large fall in the degree of utilization of productive capacities, even as the
supply function of firms is also impaired.
4. THE LOGIC OF THE ADJUSTMENT PACKAGE
The crises have been confronted with the usual orthodox economic mea-
sures, such as:
1. Freeing the exchange rate.
2. Reducing public expenditure.
3. Capping on the growth of nominal wages.
4. Reducing bank credit.
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Upon the implementation of an adjustment strategy, the economic au-
thorities anticipate that the Central Bank’s withdrawal from the foreign ex-
change market will unleash a currency depreciation due to the excessive
current account deficit and to expectations of depreciation. The latter
would eventually bring the external balance to its equilibrium level. Alleg-
edly, it would also stimulate aggregate demand because exports would grow
even if import substitution was stimulated.
Since the domestic supply is assumed to be at its potential level and im-
ports are greater than those that can be financed, it is projected that demand
would exceed supply and inflationary pressures would not be checked. In
order to cope with inflation and redress the external sector, the authorities
deem it necessary to contract aggregate demand by raising taxes and by re-
ducing government expenditures and credit to the private sector, while si-
multaneously putting a cap on the growth of money wages.
By now, the main results achieved with this set of measures of economic
policy are relatively well known. Output, real wages and investment all tend
to fall dramatically, even as inflation soars. The external imbalance is re-
dressed and exports rise, particularly when manufacturing exports weigh
heavily in total exports and when it is basically the branches of multina-
tional firms that make exports. However, the decline in imports results
mainly from the drop in output, with little or no substitution of imports
and hence without a fall in the coefficient of imports.9
These results surprise both the authorities and the international finan-
cial institutions that recommend and support this type of adjustment strat-
egy. They should not surprise anybody, however, since they are the conse-
quence of the deficiencies of the adjustment strategy. I shall now analyze
these deficiencies, considering the side-effects of the strategy for both sup-
ply and demand.
5. DEMAND AND SUPPLY OUTCOMES OF THE ADJUSTMENT PACKAGE
As previously mentioned, the depreciation of the domestic currency is a ba-
sic component of the adjustment package. Depreciation — assuming wages
are kept constant or rise moderately — makes domestic goods competitive
and, if the Marshall-Lerner condition is fulfilled, will improve the trade bal-
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ance. It is usually held that owing to that improvement, depreciation of the
currency will also expand aggregate demand.
However, both theoretical arguments and empirical studies suggest that
in Latin American and other semi-industrialized economies depreciation
may affect domestic demand negatively, even as obstacles to expansion or to
the redirection of supply limit its potential benefits for domestic producers.
I shall first consider the demand aspects involved.
On the one hand, the initial price hike triggered by depreciation can pro-
voke uncertainty concerning the future stability of prices and the exchange
rate, which will probably depress private investment. This is particularly the
case when drastic depreciation of the currency and accelerating inflation
take place after a period of stability, and when on account of the rupture of
the previous optimistic scenario a dramatic worsening of expectations pre-
dominates.
Investment can be further discouraged by the rise in the debt ratio of
firms — especially when they are indebted in foreign currency — and by the
rise in the interest rate. Unless banks are willing to expand lending and the
monetary policy accommodates, firms will find it difficult to finance their
extra needs of working and fixed capital. And finally, depreciation raises the
supply price of imported capital goods, thus reducing expected profitability.
No wonder, then, that the common pattern for crises in Latin America
has, above all, been characterized by a huge decline in private investment.
This decline does not seem to follow a fall in capital profitability, but in-
stead responds practically without delay to a sudden deterioration of finan-
cial conditions and expectations.10
On top of the above, private consumption is also depressed owing to de-
valuation. Higher-income bracket groups may not be terribly harmed by
the inflation shock because they can reduce their savings rather than their
expenditure. But since money wages are normally not completely adjusted
to past inflation, consumption per worker will fall. The fall in real wages will
prevent the wage-price spiral from fully developing into hyperinflation, but
income distribution will worsen.
To sum up, both private investment and domestic consumption are re-
duced with the depreciation of the currency. Some evidence shows that
these negative effects on internal demand are normally not offset by the
trade balance improvement brought about by depreciation.11
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In spite of this evidence, conventional adjustment packages take it for
granted that currency depreciation will expand demand. To counteract this
presumed result, the authorities reduce government expenditure and try to
get rid of any budget deficit should it come into being.
Theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence show that a reduc-
tion in public expenditure also depresses demand. But this effect has been
magnified in the Latin American experience because the composition of
government revenue also changes under the adjustment strategy. The com-
mon pattern in Latin America has been for taxes levied on the population to
rise through increases in the Value Added Tax and through an augmenta-
tion of prices charged by state firms — which are ultimately passed on to
consumers. But taxes levied on higher-income bracket groups and on busi-
ness profits are kept constant or even reduced. Thus, the share of taxes that
affect private savings falls and the share of taxes affecting private expendi-
ture declines. As a result of this change in proportions, the multiplier of
government expenditure drops.
I will now consider the effects of the adjustment package on aggregate
supply.
Critics of orthodox economics sometimes downplay the importance of
supply conditions when analyzing short-run changes in economic activity,
instead only on concentrating demand (see, however, Laski, 1994). This
emphasis, which stands in contrast to orthodox and neo-Keynesian eco-
nomics (Blinder, 1987; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1988), seems perfectly valid
for a highly developed closed economy where ample supply exists in all
branches, and where supply easily accommodates to demand under full
employment. In fact, assuming that demand will fall less than supply during
the downswing, or rise more than supply during the upswing, firms will see
their stocks of finished and semi-finished products diminish and will be
motivated to expand supply to replenish stocks. Also, when demand falls
more than supply during the downswing, or rises less than supply during
the upswing, stocks will pile up and supply will be decreased.
Semi-industrialized economies are different, however. These economies
usually have large unutilized capacities in the manufacturing sector, but in
specific industries or in other sectors such as infrastructure or agriculture
capacities may be insufficient or inadequate and bottlenecks normally ap-
pear at early stages of output expansion.
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Thus, in these economies supply may not easily accommodate to an
abrupt change in the pattern of demand, and in particular in may be hard to
substitute foreign for domestic demand when the latter contracts. Price
elasticity of demand for exports and for import substitutes may be quite
high, but capacities may be fully utilized in particular sectors, or exports
and even substitution of imports may be limited because firms may not
have adequate marketing channels to access potential customers. Domestic
producers will then be incapable to take full advantage of the latent demand
and higher profit margins ensuing from a currency depreciation.
Credit restriction further deteriorates supply conditions. Reduction in
bank credit is prominent in the adjustment package. The Central Bank nor-
mally announces, immediately after the onset of a crisis, that domestic
credit in real terms will be reduced and that the monetary policy in general
will be tightened.
The announcement and implementation of a restrictive monetary policy
would, by itself, lead to a curtailment of credit and a rise in interest rates.
But this basic tendency is magnified because both lending capacity and the
expectations of banks worsen due to the deterioration of their balance
sheets ensuing from the rise of non-performing loans caused by the crisis,
and from the increase in the service of their debt contracted in foreign cur-
rency. Thus credit restriction and credit rationing take place on a large
scale. This not only depresses demand by contracting fixed investment and
consumption of durable goods, but also decreases the aggregate supply,
thus further intensifying the decline in output.
The worsening of the supply conditions of firms during the adjustment
package can be explained as follows. In the first place, the rise in real interest
rates deteriorates their equity position due to the higher service on debt.
A second factor is credit restriction, because many small and medium-sized
firms are credit-rationed. Last, but not least, production risks become
higher. Thus, when managers face either productive or financial invest-
ments, they are likely to opt for the latter because these become relatively
more profitable and less risky.
Deterioration of supply conditions generates a leftward shift of the sup-
ply function, which also induces a leftward shift of the demand function.
This is a consequence of the reduction in output and the ensuing fall in em-
ployment, wages, and the demand for intermediate and wage goods.
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Due to credit restriction, firms are unable, during the crisis, to take ad-
vantage of the competitive gains brought about by the depreciation of the
currency and the rise in the price-cost ratio.
Exports may not be much affected. If they come from large and finan-
cially solid firms closely linked to foreign capital, these will have an easy ac-
cess to credit and will have the marketing capacities to place larger sales
abroad.12 But firms that produce for the domestic market, usually smaller
and financially weaker than those catering to the world market, will be
greatly affected by the contraction of and the rise in the price of credit. This,
on top of worsening expectations, will force them to contract supply, and
since the latter type of firms weigh heavily in the industrial sector, overall
supply is likely to shrink severely in the course of the adjustment process.
To sum up, if supply capacities are limited and if supply conditions fur-
ther deteriorate during a crisis and a credit crunch, exports and substitution
of imports will be lower than they might have been.13 The trade balance will
thus improve less and the drop in total output will consequently be larger,
due to both the smaller trade balance and the diminished value of the inter-
nal multiplier of the trade balance.
6. THE MACROECONOMICS OF A CONTRACTING ADJUSTMENT
I will now summarize the macroeconomic effects of the adjustment
package by specifying a simple model (López, 1998). I will distinguish ac-
tual output Y; the output at external equilibrium Y x; and output at full utili-
zation of productive capacities Y k, which is given in the short run.
First, I reproduce equation (1a), where effective demand Y d determines
the level of output Y:
Y = Yd = Yd (X, I p, G, w, s, τ, m) (1a)
Yx, the level of output at external equilibrium, can be expressed as fol-
lows:







e = E (p*/p') (7)
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Yx depends on world demand, Y*, on the competitiveness of internal
goods, which is established by the real exchange rate, e, on the supply condi-
tions of domestic firms, δ, and on a vector of other variables, ψ, which de-
termines the sustainable current account deficit.14 The real exchange rate e
is defined as per equation (7) depending on the nominal exchange rate E,
the index of foreign prices p*, and the domestic price index p'.
We may now examine the processes determining internal prices p, profit
margins µ, and the share of wages in value added w. With respect to prices,
two types of sectors are distinguished. In the “open” sector the price po is
given and is equal to the world price in domestic currency p*E. In the
“closed sector” I simply posit that firms fix their prices by adding a mark-up
to their unit prime costs:
po = p*E (8)
p = p(W, E, µ, π, •)  (9)
With p1, p2, p3 > 0, p4 < 0
That is, internal prices in the closed sector depend on money wages W,
the nominal exchange rate E, the unit profit margin µ, labor productivity π,
and a vector of other non-modeled variables •. I also assume that unit profit
margins depend on the supply conditions of firms δ, on the level of output
Q, and on the real exchange rate e. When demand and output are greater
firms can charge a higher profit margin. A higher real exchange rate also
tends to raise profit margins because higher import prices diminish the
pressure of foreign competition in the domestic market. Thus:
µ = µ (δ, Q, e) (10)
With µ1 < 0, µ2, µ3 > 0
If we assume that firms adjust prices immediately while wages are ad-
justed with a time lag, from (8), (9) and (10), the share of wages in the value
added w can be expressed as follows:
w = w(e, δ, Q) (11)
With w1, w2 < 0, w3 > 0
If we further assume workers demand a constant real wage, then it also
follows that any shock which leads firms to raise prices will bring about a
wedge between the real wages demanded and the real wages perceived. It
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seems safe to assume that workers will struggle for higher money wages in
the next round of negotiations. If wages are adjusted, a wage-price spiral
will develop, but the wages will not recover the previous loss.
Following Carlin and Soskice (1992) I will now define the distributive
equilibrium as the locus of points where workers are satisfied with the real
wage they earn, and where capitalists are content with the profit margin ob-
tained. The distributive equilibrium determines a situation in which the in-
flation rate is constant, since entrepreneurs are satisfied with their margins
and workers with their real wages.
I will now present a simplified account of the effects of the external
shock and of the adjustment package with the help of graph 1, where I plot
the above relationships in the e-Y plane. Output at external equilibrium Y x
is sloping upwards, and to the right of the curve the economy is in external
deficit. The distributive equilibrium curve, denoted as F, is assumed to be
horizontal.15 Above the curve lies inflation, inasmuch as money-wage de-
mands or profit margins are rising. The demand curve Yd is sloping down-
ward because a higher real exchange rate is associated with a lower share
of wages in the value added.16 Finally, output at full utilization of produc-
tive capacities Yk is drawn as a vertical line, since it does not depend on the
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The external shock shifts the curve of output at external equilibrium
leftwards, from Y x0 to Y
x
1. It also worsens expectations. This would in itself
generate a rise in profit margins and a fall in the share of wages in the value
added, but this effect is amplified because of credit restriction. As a result,
the F curve of distributive equilibrium shifts down from F0 to F2: to main-
tain the distributive equilibrium the real exchange rate would have to fall.
Finally, the aggregate demand curve shifts leftwards from Y d0 to Y
d
1. This is,
first of all, a consequence of the fall in private investment. But the shift is
greater due to the contracting fiscal and monetary policies implemented to
face the external shock. A new macroeconomic equilibrium would be pos-
sible at a lower level of output, YA.
If the government tries to defend the previous real exchange rate e0, out-
put would fall from Y0 to YB. If, instead, it tries to raise the real exchange
rate to e1, the fall would be to point YC. In either case, the result would be a
decline in output and employment. The external imbalance will be re-
dressed, and an external surplus can in fact be achieved. But the level of out-
put and degree of utilization of productive capacities will be diminished.
The fall in output will be coupled with inflationary pressures. A is the
new point where curves Yd, Y x and F coincide, while above the F curve infla-
tionary pressures predominate. These pressures will prevail for as long as
workers bargain for, and achieve, rises in money wages.
If and when workers accept a fall in their real wages, money wages will
stop rising. The F curve will shift upwards, and a lower real wage and a lower
share of wages in the value added will allow for a rise in the real exchange
rate and will stop inflation. As the Latin American experience shows, the
period before inflation is controlled may be long-lived and real wages may
have to fall dramatically in order for inflation to subside.17 Furthermore,
output, the degree of utilization of productive capacities, and employment
will fall. The fall may be dramatic indeed, as in Chile en 1982 (where GDP
fell 14 percent) or in Mexico in 1995 (where GDP fell 7 percent).
Supporters of the adjustment package sometimes accept that their poli-
cies will generate a decline in output, but they argue that the fall is, in any
case, inescapable because the country was living “beyond its means”, or that
the fall will be short-lived, or both. Growth of exports, so the argument
goes, will rather sooner than later drag domestic and aggregate demand
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with it, even as it lifts the external constraint. They also use to cite the cases
of Chile and Mexico, where growth resumed after a dramatic downfall.
Without going into a deep discussion, it can simply be said that they are
misinterpreting the above-mentioned experiences.
In Chile, for example, growth in fact resumed from 1984 onwards (with
a pause in 1985) but only because both the external situation and the eco-
nomic strategy changed. Between 1982 and 1987, the external constraint
was lifted thanks to a dramatic increase in foreign lending from multilateral
agencies, probably for political reasons.18 The government could expand its
gross external debt, which rose from 6.6 to 16.4 billions of US dollars. Fur-
thermore, the servicing of the external debt was renegotiated in very favor-
able conditions, and the share of export revenues devoted to servicing the
foreign debt fell from 83.8 percent in 1981 to 48.7 percent in 1986. Finally, a
rather more expansionary fiscal policy was implemented, coupled with an
increase in tariffs that enhanced the protection of domestic producers.
In Mexico, to take another example, growth also resumed after the dra-
matic downfall in output of 1995. During 1996 and until 1999, relatively high
rates of growth of output, averaging about 7 percent on an annual basis, have
been attained. But the recovery could only be achieved because of a rise in oil
prices which dramatically swelled government revenues. Thus public expen-
diture could be raised without incurring a deficit (López, 2000).
In short, in both Chile and Mexico output recovery did not come as the
result of a somewhat delayed but spontaneous working of the beneficial ef-
fects of the adjustment package. Rather, external conditions once again be-
came favorable and, accordingly, the curve of output at external equilibrium
shifted to the right. Government policies changed and government demand
expanded, and the demand curve therefore also shifted to the right. In both
cases it was the government and not the market that led the recovery.
It is not difficult to understand why government intervention is indis-
pensable for recovery. Crises affect not only workers but firms as well. The
fall in private investment and in the budget deficit tends to contract profits,
and that contraction may not be offset by the rise in external surplus.19 And
even if export surplus rises enough for profits to increase, the degree of uti-
lization of productive capacities will probably decline due to the shift to
profits and the consequent expansion in the savings coefficient. Thus firms
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will not be stimulated to enlarge their productive capacity with new invest-
ments. Mexico’s experience between 1982 and 1986 shows that this scenario
of stagnation, following a contracting adjustment package, is very likely,
and that it may be long-lived indeed.
NOTES
1. Mexico also implemented adjustment packages in 1982 and 1983 that were very similar
in nature to the more recent one.
2. A detailed study on Mexico found that between 1986 and 1993 the share of consumer
credit (residential construction plus other consumer credit) in domestic bank credit
rose from 10.8 percent to 27.6 percent (Danby, 1997). However, as this author acknowl-
edges, large firms increasingly had access to foreign credit, which was much cheaper
than domestic credit.
3. Manufacturing exports grew strongly in the case of Mexico. In the case of Chile it was
mostly exports of primary goods that rose.
4. In the case of Mexico, for example, according to a recent estimate, the import coefficient
of the export industry (excluding the maquiladora or in-bond sector), defined as the
value of imports of inputs over the value of exports, grew from 8.6% in 1983 to 61% in
1994 (Vázquez, 1995).
5. We simplify the analysis by equating the current account deficit and the trade deficit.
6. Where Y1 stands for the first derivative of Y with respect to exports, Y2 for the first de-
rivative with respect to private investment, etc. The sign of the partial derivatives follows
from: C = Y(1 – w)(1 – τ)(1 – s)+ wY(1 – τ); M = mY; T = τY. We assume workers do not
save.
7. In a private and closed economy a rise in the rate of saving will not raise total savings in
the short run. In fact, since profits equal investment plus capitalist consumption, it may
even provoke a fall in savings in the medium and long run inasmuch as it causes profits
to decline. By the same token, in an open economy, where saving is equal to capitalist
expenditure plus the budget deficit plus the trade surplus, a rise in savings will raise total
savings in the short run, but may depress savings in the medium and long run.
8. The following statement, made two weeks before the devaluation of December 1994 in
Mexico by the Governor of Mexico’s Central Bank, is typical: “The size of the current
account deficit is, in a certain manner, a measure of the country’s success, not of its fail-
ure (...) the greater the success of Mexico as an attractive country for investment, the
bigger the current account deficit will be”.
9. The results of the adjustment strategy in Brazil differ from the above description, espe-
cially because the 1999 devaluation did not provoke a great acceleration of inflation
which is all the more remarkable given Brazil’s pre-Real inflation experience. Also, the
GDP did not collapse and a process of import substitution apparently took place. I do
not consider the specificity of Brazil’s experience in this paper.
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10. In Mexico, private investment, which had grown almost 10 percent between 1993 and
1994, fell 31 percent between 1994 and 1995. In Chile, total investment grew 17 percent
between 1980 and 1981, to fall 34 percent in 1982.
11. The Krugman and Taylor paper (1978), where these problems are formally analyzed, is
still very much worth reading. See also Taylor (1988) and, on the Mexican experience,
see for example J. López, 1991, and Castro et al., 1997.
12. The different composition of sales and in the industrial sector is probably an important
factor behind the different behavior of exports after the crises in Mexico and Chile. In
the former, two years after the crisis (that is, in 1997) exports were 32 percent higher
than when the crisis erupted, while in the latter, two years after the crisis (in 1983) they
had practically not grown at all.
13. One should recall that price and income elasticities of exports and imports depend on
the elasticity of demand and on the elasticity of supply.
14. The value of the sustainable current account deficit is mostly based on conventions.
15. This is a simplification, because it could be also upward — or downward — sloping.
16. A higher real exchange rate depresses w on two counts. First, the relationship between
prices of raw materials and total wages rises (Kalecki). Second, profit margins rise with
the real exchange rate.
17. In Chile, real wages fell 15 percent between 1981 and 1985. In Mexico, they fell 15 per-
cent (seasonally adjusted) between the last quarter of 1994 and the third quarter of
1995.
18. From 1987 onwards an additional factor was the steady rise in the international price of
copper, Chile’s main export.
19. One should recall that profits are equal to the sum of private investment and capitalist
consumption, plus the government deficit plus the trade surplus.
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